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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the issue of key employee compensation 
in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings.  Section II first looks at the 
history of key employee retention plans before analyzing recent 
legislative changes that have curtailed the effectiveness of such 
plans.  Section III analyzes the new legislation and the changes it 
has made to key employee compensation motions in bankruptcy.  
Finally, Section IV offers recommendations for changes to the 
current statutes and other ways to halt unjustifiably large bonuses 
being paid to employees of bankrupt corporations. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Way We Were: Employee Bonuses Before 2005 
Executive compensation is a hot topic in American politics.1  
The subject has recently been in the news due to the current 
unstable economy.2  Executive bonuses, especially, have been 
sharply examined in the media.3
It is not, however, merely a recent bone of contention in 
Washington, D.C., or around the country.  Congress first tackled 
the issue in a failed piece of legislation: the Employee Abuse 
Prevention Act of 2002.
 
4  That bill was intended to “protect 
employees and retirees from corporate practices that deprive them 
of their earnings and retirement savings when a business files for 
bankruptcy.”5  It was not until 2005, however, and the enactment of 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(“BAPCPA”) that Congress finally passed legislation tackling the 
issue of executive compensation in the context of business 
bankruptcies.6
What was the problem Congress was attempting to fix?  Pre-
BAPCPA, Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession
 
7 often filed motions 
seeking court approval of a “key employee retention program” 
(“KERP”).8
 
 1. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, In Bailout Furor, Wall Street Pay Becomes a Target, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2008, at A1.  For example, the New York Times online has a “Times 
Topics” section dedicated solely to executive compensation issues.  See Times 
Topics: Executive Pay, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ 
subjects/e/executive_pay/index.html?scp=1spot&sq=executive%20compensatio&
st=cse (last visited Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Times Topics]. 
 2. See Times Topics, supra note 1. 
 3. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Royal Pay at Delphi, Reined in by a Judge, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2008, at BU. 
 4. Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2798, H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. 
(2002). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. 
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA]. 
 7. A debtor-in-possession is a special creation of Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  11 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2006).  A debtor-in-possession is the 
debtor, but is also vested with the rights and powers of a trustee in bankruptcy.  11 
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2006); see also Georgia Pac. Corp. v. Sigma Serv. Corp., 712 F.2d 
962, 965 (5th Cir. 1983).  A full discussion of these rights and the related duties of 
a trustee or debtor-in-possession is outside the scope of this article. 
 8. See infra Part II.A.4. 
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1. What Is a KERP? 
A key employee retention plan is just that—a means for a 
company undergoing Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings to retain 
important members of its management structure.9  A KERP usually 
included “lump-sum retention payments to employees who remain 
employed by the debtor through a particular date,”10 along with 
possible bonus payments and/or severance payments due upon 
involuntary termination.11  These plans were usually offered to the 
debtor’s executive officers and senior management.12
2. The Purpose of KERPs 
 
Many arguments were put forward to justify the use of KERPs 
in retaining key employees.  The most common of these was the 
need to persuade employees to stick with a company undergoing 
the unsteady process of bankruptcy reorganization.13  In addition, 
debtors often argued that the cost of hiring and training new 
employees would cost more than using bonuses to persuade 
current employees to remain on the job.14  Notions of equity were 
also argued—employees should earn a bonus “for their hard work 
and dedication to the business.”15  Finally, debtors argued that 
certain employees were just too important to the management 
structure and needed to be retained in order to promote continuity 
and preserve the value of the business as a whole.16
 
 9. Paul R. Hage, Key Employee Retention Plans Under BAPCPA: Is There Anything 
Left?, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 Art. 4, Part I.B.2 (2008). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at Part I.B.1.  See also A. Mechele Dickerson, Approving Employee 
Retention and Severance Programs: Judicial Discretion Run Amuck?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. 
L. REV. 93, 98 (2003).  See also In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
2001) (summarizing the benefits to the company achieved by retaining important 
employees).  For a list of common arguments in favor of KERPs and a critique of 
these arguments, see Robert J. Keach, Seventh Annual Great Debates: Resolved: 
Incentive and Retention Programs Should Be Banned, Am. Bankr. Inst., Part III, Apr. 10, 
2003.  
 14. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 98; see also Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 79 (describing 
costs associated with headhunters and recruitment of new employees). 
 15. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 98. 
 16. Id. at 99; see also Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 81–82 (finding that employees 
eligible for the retention payments were necessary for the successful 
reorganization of the company). 
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All of these arguments rest on the underlying objective of a 
bankruptcy reorganization—to maximize the value of the estate or 
the business so that creditors can recoup the greatest amount 
possible from the debtor.17  By retaining key employees, the 
business can continue to operate and can implement the 
reorganization process more quickly and efficiently.18
3. The Statutory Authority and Standards for KERPs 
 
KERPs are mentioned nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code.  
However, “[p]rior to BAPCPA, bankruptcy courts generally agreed 
that KERPs were an important tool in the Chapter 11 rehabilitative 
process.”19  The court’s power in approving KERPs arises through 
two bankruptcy code provisions: sections 105 and 363.  Section 105 
provides that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this title.”20
Section 363 governs the use, sale, or lease of the debtor’s 
property after the debtor has entered bankruptcy.
  This section grants very broad power to 
the bankruptcy court. 
21  Section 363 
authorizes the debtor-in-possession, with the court’s approval, to 
“use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, 
property of the estate.”22
In approving any use of the debtor’s property outside the 
ordinary course of business, the bankruptcy court will apply the 
“business judgment rule.”
  Because KERP payments were not normal 
payments made to the debtor’s employees, court approval of the 
KERP was necessary.   
23
 
 17. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 8 B.R. 371, 374 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (“The 
purpose of bankruptcy is to provide an equal opportunity for all creditors to share 
in the assets of the debtor available for distribution.”). 
 18. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 99.  Dickerson cites to both Aerovox, 269 B.R. 
at 82, and In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147, 150 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 1999), as examples of cases where certain employees were found to be 
essential to the successful reorganization of the debtor. 
 19. Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3. 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
 21. Id. § 363 (2006). 
 22. § 363(b)(1). 
 23. Montgomery Ward, 242 B.R. at 153; Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3. 
  “In evaluating whether a sound 
business purpose justifies the use, sale or lease of property under 
Section 363(b), courts consider a variety of factors, which 
5
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essentially represent a ‘business judgment test.’”24  This business 
judgment test is not a rigid set of guidelines; rather it is a weighing 
of certain factors and the circumstances of the case.25  The business 
judgment test usually focuses on whether “the debtor exercised 
proper business judgment in formulating the program, i.e., 
whether a sound business practice justifies the request,”26 and 
“whether the proposed program is fair and reasonable.”27  This test, 
however, is not a difficult one for the debtor to pass.  As the court 
stated in In re Aerovox, Inc., “a debtor’s business decision ‘should be 
approved by the court unless it is shown to be so manifestly 
unreasonable that it could not be based upon sound business 
judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.’”28
[D]ebtor-proposed KERPS will be approved if the debtor 
demonstrates (
  As one 
commentator has pointed out, this threshold is relatively low and 
weighted heavily in the debtor’s favor: 
through evidence) that the KERP 
constitutes a proper exercise of sound business judgment 
and the KERP is “fair and reasonable under the 
circumstances.”  Significant deference is paid to the 
debtor’s business judgment, despite the obvious interest 
of senior management in achieving approval of the 
KERP.29
4. Examples of KERPs in Action 
 
In order to study the changes BAPCPA made in the 
implementation of KERPs, it is important to understand previous 
KERP iterations prior to BAPCPA.  The four cases described below 
demonstrate the court’s role in approving, modifying, and denying 
 
 24. Montgomery Ward, 242 B.R. at 153. 
 25. In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80–81 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001); Montgomery 
Ward, 242 B.R. at 154.  The Second Circuit emphasized the need to weigh the 
circumstances by declaring that: 
In fashioning its findings, a bankruptcy judge must not blindly follow the 
hue and cry of the most vocal special interest groups; rather, he should 
consider all salient factors pertaining to the proceeding and, accordingly, 
act to further the diverse interests of the debtor, creditors and equity 
holders, alike. 
In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 26. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 98. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 80 (citing In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (additional citations omitted)). 
 29. Keach, supra note 13, at Part II. 
6
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proposed KERPs prior to the enactment of BAPCPA. 
a. In re Geneva Steel Co.30
Geneva Steel Company sought approval of a retention 
program for six of its senior executives and thirty managers.
 
31  The 
plan consisted of a severance plan for the six senior executives and 
a bonus payable to the executives and the managers upon 
emergence from bankruptcy.32  The severance plan paid the 
executives six months’ salary if they were terminated prior to the 
“substantial consummation of a plan of reorganization,”33 or nine 
months’ salary if the executives were terminated within ninety days 
of plan consummation.34  The bonus plan entitled the executives to 
a payment of 50% of their annual salary upon plan confirmation 
and gave the managers a discretionary bonus of up to 25% of their 
annual salary.35
When the court addressed Geneva’s motion for approval, it 
expressed disapproval that Geneva had neither sought nor 
obtained the approval of the Steelworkers Union.
 
36  “Management 
may appropriately reserve decisions on executive benefits to itself 
and its directors when all is well, but when the continued existence 
of the business is in question and the executive benefits are subject 
to court approval, the dynamics of the decision making process 
must change.”37  The court held that the severance package was too 
much of a potential windfall to the executives because it did not 
contain a mitigation provision if the executive found work within 
the six to nine-month period after termination.38  The court also 
opined that the bonuses payable to the executives should be made 
in the form of stock rather than in cash.39
 
 30. 236 B.R. 770 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999). 
 31. Id. at 771. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 772. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 773 (“The court finds that to propose this retention program 
without first having discussed its provisions with the Steelworkers is not an 
example of sound business judgment.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 773–74. 
 39. Id. at 774. 
  With these potential 
flaws pointed out, the court denied Geneva’s motion but expressly 
left open the possibility that an amended plan would be 
7
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entertained by the court in the future if the debtor presented 
one.40
b. In re Aerovox, Inc.
 
41
Aerovox, Inc. entered Chapter 11 with a goal of finding a 
buyer for its assets.
 
42  The debtor proposed a plan that would give 
key employees a retention plan bonus of three months’ salary when 
the employee was either involuntarily terminated, all of the 
debtor’s assets were sold, or on June 6, 2002, whichever came first.43  
The plan also proposed a severance package that included at least a 
payment equal to six months’ salary for the employee.44  The 
debtor argued that the plan was necessary to prevent critical 
employees from leaving the company.45  However, the Unsecured 
Creditors Committee “maintained that the KERP was unnecessary 
and excessive and was not designed to achieve a particular result.”46  
The Unsecured Creditors Committee argued that the debtor 
should prove that the key personnel whom the debtor was trying to 
retain were in fact threatening to leave.47
In determining whether to approve the business decision 
of a debtor-in-possession or a trustee, the “bankruptcy 
court sits as an overseer of the wisdom with which the 
bankruptcy estate’s property is being managed by the 
trustee or debtor-in-possession, and not, as it does in other 
circumstances, as the arbiter of disputes between the 
creditors and the estate.”
 
The court examined the evidence and applied the business 
judgment rule to the debtor’s proposal and its supporting 
evidence. 
48
Based upon the facts and circumstances of the proposed plans, the 
court deferred to the debtor’s judgment that the retention and 
severance plans were indeed necessary and appropriate.
 
49
 
 40. Id. 
 41. 269 B.R. 74 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001). 
 42. Id. at 78. 
 43. Id. at 77. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 75. 
 46. Id. at 76. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 80 (citing In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 
1993)). 
 49. Id. at 81. 
  As 
8
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additional support for its decision, the court also noted that the 
objecting unsecured creditors had not produced any evidence that 
rebutted the debtor’s evidence that the KERP was an exercise of 
sound business judgment.50
c. In re Interco Inc.
 
51
In In re Interco, Inc., the court analyzed the proposed retention 
plan, focusing on factors like the necessity of the company to retain 
certain employees for a successful reorganization, the current 
below-industry standard compensation of the executives, the use of 
performance goals as a measure of the amount of the bonus to be 
given, the reasonableness of the costs as opposed to the risk to the 
entire reorganization without the critical executives, and the use of 
similar plans in other bankruptcies.
 
52  After examining this 
evidence, the court found that the debtor’s business judgment was 
acceptable and the proposed plan would be confirmed as an 
exercise of sound business judgment.53
d. In re Allied Holdings, Inc.
 
54
In In re Allied Holdings, Inc., the debtors, with the support of 
the Unsecured Creditors Committee and the secured lenders, 
proposed a KERP that would benefit four “tiers” of employees.
 
55  
The plan provided a retention or emergence bonus equal to a 
certain percentage of the employee’s annual salary as follows: Tier 
1: 75% to 90%; Tier 2: 59.4% to 85%; Tier 3: 35% to 50%; and Tier 
4: 20% to 25%.56  The bonuses were to be paid in four installments, 
payable on certain milestones and dates.57  There was also an 
additional fund of $150,000 from which the debtor could give 
discretionary bonuses of not more than $30,000 to an employee.58  
The KERP, however, was opposed by the union representing the 
debtors’ employees and the United States Trustee.59
 
 50. Id. at 82. 
 51. 128 B.R. 229 (Bankr. M.D. Mo. 1991). 
 52. Id. at 230–32. 
 53. Id. at 234. 
 54. 337 B.R. 716 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005). 
 55. Id. at 717–18. 
 56. Id. at 718. 
 57. Id. at 718–19. 
 58. Id. at 719. 
 59. Id. at 717. 
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The court assessed the plan and applied the business 
judgment rule, requiring that there be a sound business purpose 
for the plan and that the plan be fair and reasonable.60  As the 
court stated, “[t]his approach avoids the possibility that the debtor 
will have unfettered discretion in devising a plan and also permits 
the Court to ‘analyze factors, based on the facts and circumstances 
of each case,’ and ‘to tailor the Retention Plan to accomplish 
necessary goals.’”61  Because the debtors had sought the advice of 
an outside consultant, had secured the unsecured committee’s 
participation in the creation of the KERP, and had created a 
compensation committee to oversee the formulation of the KERP, 
the debtors had clearly used sound business judgment to achieve a 
reasonable plan.62
The court did, however, reduce the bonuses payable to the top 
two tiers of employees because “the payment of such large 
bonuses . . . at this time would be unfair to the Debtors’ unionized 
employees, considering the fact that the parties have indicated that 
the Debtors must seek further concessions from the unionized 
employees .”
 
63  The court ordered that the KERP be approved with 
the caveat that Tier 1 bonuses were not to exceed 75% of annual 
salary and Tier 2 bonuses were not to exceed 70% of annual 
salary.64
5. Criticisms of KERPs 
 
These cases demonstrate the court’s involvement in the 
approval and modification of proposed KERPs.  This involvement, 
however, was not without its detractors. 
While the court had the power to and did approve KERPs, 
there were several arguments against their availability to debtors.  
First amongst these was the simple fact that KERPs were not 
necessarily that useful.  “There is no evidence that bonus payments 
actually result in the retention of employees who would otherwise 
leave, and considerable anecdotal evidence in cases with KERPS 
that they made no material difference.”65
 
 60. Id. at 722. 
 61. Id. (quoting In re Georgetown Steel, LLC, 306 B.R. 549, 556 (Bankr. 
D.S.C. 2004)). 
 62. Id. at 722–24. 
 63. Id. at 725. 
 64. Id. at 726–27. 
  In addition to their 
 65. Keach, supra note 13, at Part IV.  Keach cites examples from both the 
10
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doubtful utility in retaining employees, KERPs also often have a 
negative impact on employee morale as a whole.66  This effect was 
noted by the court in Geneva Steel, discussed above.67  In Geneva Steel, 
the debtor was chastised by the court for failing to seek the 
employee union’s acquiescence to the proposed retention and 
bonus plan for senior executives and noted “the depth of the 
[union’s] opposition” to the KERP.68  The court denied the 
proposed KERP because it had too many windfall qualities for the 
benefit of the executives.69
Courts have sometimes factored in the disparity between the 
salaries earned by a debtor’s executives with the salaries paid to 
executives in similar, yet financially sound, businesses.
 
70
The assumption that persons employed by companies in 
bankruptcy should receive as much as those not in that 
unfortunate state is one of the primary places where 
bankruptcy realities run directly counter to the instinctive 
views of the rest of the world.  When confronted with 
economic difficulties outside of bankruptcy, we usually 
assume we must spend less on ourselves and cannot afford 
the same amount of professional assistance.
  But why 
should an executive who has seen his company fall into financial 
hardship necessarily expect or deserve a “market rate” salary?  
71
Yet bankruptcy courts have allowed companies to bolster the pay 
packages offered to executives even after those executives have 
helmed the ship as it was going down.
 
72
Another worrisome aspect of KERP implementation is the 
court’s deferential standard in examining the need and 
reasonableness of the proposed plan.  As discussed above, a court 
would apply the business judgment rule to determine the 
 
 
Kmart and Enron bankruptcies, demonstrating that the implementation of a 
KERP had very little effect on the number of employees who were leaving the 
company on a weekly basis.  Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See supra Part II.A.4.a. 
 68. In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999). 
 69. Id. at 773–74. 
 70. See, e.g., In re Interco Inc., 128 B.R. 229, 231 (Bankr. M.D. Mo. 1991). 
 71. Karen Cordry & Zachary Mosner, Challenging the “Lake Wobegon Syndrome”: 
What Hath Congress Wrought with KERPS?, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12 (2006). 
 72. See, e.g., In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 82 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) 
(stating that the debtor showed that the KERP was an exercise of sound business 
judgment); Interco, 128 B.R. at 234 (stating that the court accepted the debtor’s 
business judgment regarding incentive retention programs). 
11
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appropriateness of the proposed KERP.73  The application of the 
business judgment rule in essence meant that the court would 
approve the KERP so long as the plan was not “so manifestly 
unreasonable that it could not be based on sound business 
judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.”74  While this 
standard may be a good measure for a debtor’s use of its property 
in arms-length transactions,75 it is much harder to apply to a plan 
that has been negotiated by the same managers and executives who 
stand to benefit from its implementation.76  Often the evidence 
provided by the debtor is through the testimony of experts who are 
paid by the debtor (and thus by the executives who manage the 
debtor’s business).77  For example, in Aerovox, the court relied on 
the testimony of two of the debtor’s executives in holding that the 
proposed KERP was a sound business judgment on the part of the 
debtor.78
KERPS breed a lack of faith in, and a lack of respect for, 
the bankruptcy system among creditors and rank and file 
employees who cannot grasp how the guys who drove the 
bus off the road get bonuses while vendors go unpaid, 
retiree benefits are slashed, and other wage-related, 
  Though not necessarily unreliable, such evidence should 
perhaps be scrutinized by the court under a less deferential 
standard than the business judgment rule. 
Finally, KERPs tend to undermine the reputation of the 
bankruptcy system as a whole.   
 
 73. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 74. In re Logical Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) 
(citing Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 
1047 (4th Cir. 1985)). 
 75. Section 363 of the United States Code requires court approval of all 
transactions in which the debtor proposes to use, sell, or lease any of its property 
“other than in the ordinary course of business.”  11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).  
The bankruptcy courts have created the business judgment rule to determine 
when there is sufficient reason or benefit to use the estate property to offset the 
immediate loss of the property from the estate.  See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 
1063, 1071–72 (2d Cir. 1983).  Thus, in an arms-length transaction, the benefits 
and disadvantages to the bankruptcy estate are more clearly delineated. 
 76. Cordry & Mosner, supra note 71, at 61. 
 77. See Keach, supra note 13, at Part II (“The supporting ‘evidence’ cited in 
the decided cases is generally vague and self-serving . . . .  [M]ost of the evidence is 
in the form of testimony of insiders (often executives who will benefit from the 
KERP) and of HR ‘experts’ who design KERPS.  One has to question the reliability 
of such evidence.”).  See also Gretchen Morgenson, Gilded Paychecks: Troubling 
Conflicts; Outside Advice on Boss’s Pay May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
2006, at A1. 
 78. In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 78–80 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001). 
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pension and severance claims remain unsatisfied.79
B. After Several Huge,  High-Profile Bankruptcies Were Filed, KERPs 
Came Into the Public Awareness 
 
This criticism became more and more obvious as a wave of large 
bankruptcies produced newsworthy accounts of huge bonus 
packages paid to top executives. 
Starting in 2001, several high-profile bankruptcy cases entered 
the public’s awareness.80  Along with these high-profile 
bankruptcies came news stories detailing the huge retention plans 
that were proposed by the companies.81
The first of these companies to seek a huge retention bonus 
program was Polaroid Corporation.
 
82  The debtors asked the court 
to allow bonus and incentive payments to about forty-five 
executives and up to $19 million.83  These payments would be in 
addition to the executives’ receipt of 5% to 6% of the proceeds 
from a sale of Polaroid’s assets.84  This proposal, however, was 
strenuously opposed by a group of Polaroid’s retirees and 
employees.85  The employees and retirees were incensed at the 
prospect of such a huge payment to Polaroid’s executives after the 
company had already laid off thousands and had cut medical and 
life insurance benefits for employees.86
 
 79. Keach, supra note 13, at Part IV. 
 80. See Stephen Labaton, Crime and Consequences Still Weigh on Corporate World; 
Four Years Later, Enron’s Shadow Lingers as Change Comes Slowly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 
2006, at C1 (including a chart that provides a timeline of major bankruptcy filings 
and the criminal proceedings against many of the major executives of the 
bankrupt companies). 
 81. See Polaroid Seeks to Reward Top Executives with Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
2001, at C3; Thomas S. Mulligan, Judge OKs Enron Plan to Retain Senior Workers, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at Business Desk 3; Jennifer LeClaire, Bonuses Amid 
Bankruptcy Draw Ire of Axed Workers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 17, 2002, at 14; 
James S. Granelli, Global Crossing Offers Bonus Plan, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at 
Business Desk 2; Rebecca Blumenstein, WorldCom Judge Approves Plan to Keep 
Employees, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at B3. 
 82. See Polaroid Seeks to Reward Top Executives, supra note 81. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Polaroid Retirees Oppose Bonus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2001, at C10; see 
also Polaroid Withdraws $5 Million Bonus Plan to Retain Executives, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 
2002, at B5 [hereinafter Polaroid Withdraws]. 
 86. Polaroid Withdraws, supra note 85. 
  In the end, Polaroid 
withdrew its plan in response to the intense pressure from the 
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employees and retirees.87
Enron was the next major bankruptcy to hit the public 
consciousness.
 
88  The debtors quickly moved for and received 
judicial approval of a retention bonus plan.  “Under the proposal, 
about 1,700 employees would share $40 million in retention 
bonuses, $7 million in severance payments and from $47.4 million 
to $90 million in incentive bonuses based on the amount of cash 
raised from asset sales.”89  While these huge amounts raised public 
ire, an even more controversial provision of the Enron plan 
allowed waivers to be given to certain employees, which allowed 
those employees to retain large bonuses just before Enron filed for 
bankruptcy.90
Kmart also implemented a large executive retention bonus 
plan.  As one reporter pointed out, the disparity between the 
treatment of executives and the treatment of rank-and-file 
employees was often astounding: “Kmart . . . is awarding retention 
bonuses worth $150 million to managers while more than 22,000 
workers are sent home without severance, for example, and . . . 
Enron is paying $140 million to hold key personnel while cutting 
about 4,500 jobs.”
 
91  Public pressure was mounting—“some view it 
as ironic that company captains are receiving major money to stay 
on board when they are presumably the ones who steered the 
business into the rocks.”92
In 2002, Global Crossing Ltd. sought bankruptcy court 
approval of a retention plan that “would pay nine executive vice 
presidents bonuses of up to half of their annual salaries and 295 
other high  level executives up to 27.5% of their pay.”
  The companies, however, kept the plans 
coming even as public scrutiny increased. 
93  The plan 
would pay out up to $15 million total.94  The company would, 
however, also be cutting 16% of its workforce in the reorganization 
process.95
 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Labaton, supra note 80. 
 89. Mulligan, supra note 81. 
 90. Id. 
 91. LeClaire, supra note 81. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Granelli, supra note 81. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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C. The Legislature Took Notice and Acted 
As these huge bankruptcies became more common and the 
public became aware of these valuable payouts to executives, 
Congress attempted to rein in the corporations.  The first attempt, 
which proved unsuccessful, was the Employee Abuse Prevention 
Act of 2002.96
The Employee Abuse Prevention Act was intended “[t]o 
protect employees and retirees from corporate practices that 
deprive them of their earnings and retirement savings when a 
business files for bankruptcy . . . .”
   
97  Section 104 of the bill 
proposed an amendment to section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code.98  
That amendment would place restrictions on payments made “to 
an insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to 
remain with the debtor’s business”99 on “a severance payment to an 
insider of the debtor”100 and on “other transfers or obligations that 
are outside the ordinary course of business and not justified by the 
facts and circumstances of the case.”101
In 2005, Congress considered the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.
  However, this bill was never 
enacted. 
102  While the bill was 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Kennedy 
introduced an amendment to section 503(c) that was extremely 
similar to section 104 of the Employee Abuse Prevention Act.103  
The purpose of the amendment was “[t]o expand the authority of 
bankruptcy courts to limit retention bonuses and severance pay to 
corporate insiders.”104
Further legislative history about this portion of the bill is 
scanty.  During the extensive debate on the bill, Senator Kennedy 
rose and pointed to the Polaroid Company bankruptcy as an 
example of corporate insiders receiving handsome bonuses at the 
 
 
 96. S. 2798, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 97. S. 2798; H.R. 5221 (citing the title of the bill). 
 98. S. 2798 § 104; H.R. 5221 § 104. 
 99. S. 2798 § 104(c)(1)(A); H.R. 5221 § 104(c)(1)(A). 
 100. S. 2798 § 104(c)(1)(B); H.R. 5221 § 104(c)(1)(B). 
 101. S. 2798 § 104(c)(1)(C); H.R. 5221 § 104(c)(1)(C). 
 102. S. 256, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 685, 109th Cong. (2005) (enacted). 
 103. Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 88 (2007).  
See also Amend. No. 5202 to S. 256, 109th Cong. (2005), 
http://www.abiworld.org/pdfs/amend5202.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2009). 
 104. Amend. No. 5202 to S. 256, 109th Cong. (2005) (citing the purpose as 
listed on the amendment). 
15
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expense of the rank and file employees.105
Current law on corporate bankruptcy is grossly 
inadequate in dealing with these problems.  Often, the 
very insiders whose misconduct brought the company 
down do very well in bankruptcy. . . .  Increasingly, the 
bankruptcy court has become a place where corporate 
executives go to get permission to line their own pockets 
and break their promise to their workers and retirees.
  He went on to say that: 
106
Several other times during the debate, large bankruptcies like 
Adelphia, Enron, United Airlines, TWA, Kmart, Polaroid, and 
Global Crossing were mentioned.
   
107
On March 10, 2005, BAPCPA passed in the Senate.
   
108  The 
House debated on the bill for only one hour.109  The House passed 
it the same day.110  President Bush signed the bill into law on April 
20, 2005.111
With the passage of BAPCPA, section 503(c) was inserted into 
the Code.
 
112
 
 105. 151 CONG. REC. S1979, 1990-91 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
 106. Id. at S1990.  Senator Kennedy was not alone in his condemnation of the 
current state of affairs.  Senator Durbin also rose to point out several examples of 
corporate insiders receiving huge bonuses: 
If I went to Illinois and asked the people I represent what they think we 
should do when it comes to bankruptcy, I am virtually certain that the 
first thing they would say to me is, you have to do something about these 
horrible corporate bankruptcies, Enron, WorldCom, and the list goes on, 
and the abuses which these officers and CEOs have demonstrated as 
heads of these corporations, the fact that because they were feathering 
their own beds when their companies went bankrupt, hurting 
shareholders, hurting employees, hurting investors in pension plans, and 
hurting retirees.  I think my constituents in Illinois are right.  When it 
comes to bankruptcy, that is the scandal in America.   
Id. at S1986. 
 107. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21, S1818 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of 
Sen. Durbin); 151 CONG. REC. 23 at S1987 (statement of Sen. Durbin); 151 CONG. 
REC. 23 at S1991 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 108. 151 CONG. REC. 28, S2474 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2005).  The vote was 74 yeas, 
25 nays, and 1 abstention (Sen. Clinton). 
 109. 151 CONG. REC. 44, H1974 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005). 
 110. Id. at H1991–92. 
 111. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 112. Id. 
  That section is worth setting forth here in full: 
 
§ 503.  Allowance of administrative expenses 
 
* * * 
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 (c)  Notwithstanding subsection (b), there shall neither be 
allowed, nor paid — 
(1) a transfer made to, or an obligation incurred for the 
benefit of, an insider of the debtor for the purpose of 
inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s 
business, absent a finding by the court based on evidence 
in the record that— 
(A) the transfer or obligation is essential to retention 
of the person because the individual has a bona fide 
job offer from another business at the same or 
greater rate of compensation; 
(B) the services provided by the person are essential 
to the survival of the business; and 
(C) either— 
(i) the amount of the transfer made to, or 
obligation incurred for the benefit of, the person 
is not greater than the amount equal to 10 times 
the amount of the mean transfer or obligation of 
a similar kind given to nonmanagement 
employees for any purpose during the calendar 
year in which the transfer is made or the 
obligation is incurred; or 
(ii) if no such similar transfers were made to, or 
obligations were incurred for the benefit of, such 
nonmanagement employees during such 
calendar year, the amount of the transfer or 
obligation is not greater than an amount equal 
to 25 percent of the amount of any similar 
transfer or obligation made to or incurred for 
the benefit of such insider for any purpose 
during the calendar year before the year in 
which such transfer is made or obligation is 
incurred; 
(2) a severance payment to an insider of the debtor, 
unless— 
(A) the payment is part of a program that is generally 
applicable to all full-time employees; and 
(B) the amount of the payment is not greater than 10 
times the amount of the mean severance pay given to 
nonmanagement employees during the calendar year 
in which the payment is made; or 
(3) other transfers or obligations that are outside the 
ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts 
17
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and circumstances of the case, including transfers made 
to, or obligations incurred for the benefit of, officers, 
managers, or consultants hired after the date of the filing 
of the petition.113
The language of this section purports to strictly limit payments to 
insiders of the debtor, be they bonuses or severance payments.  In 
practice, however, this purpose has been left to judicial 
interpretation.
 
114
III. ANALYSIS 
 
A. The Decisions Since BAPCPA 
The bankruptcy court has only had a handful of chances to 
apply the new section 503(c) to proposed bonus plans.  The 
following cases are briefly examined to serve as an overview.  The 
decisions and the rules that can be gleaned from them are more 
closely examined in Part III.B below. 
1. In re Nobex Corp.115
In re Nobex was one of the first opportunities for the bankruptcy 
court to apply the new section 503(c).  The debtors were not 
reorganizing but were seeking a sale of all of the company’s 
assets.
 
116  The debtors proposed a bonus plan for two of its 
managers.117  The plan proposed to pay the managers a bonus 
equal to a percentage of the gross purchase price received for the 
sale of the company’s assets, with the applicable percentage 
increasing as the sale price increased.118
The court found that the two managers eligible for the bonus 
packages were critical to the winding-down of the business.
   
119  The 
court also found that “[t]he unique skills and expertise of [the 
managers] are essential to the Debtor’s successful implementation 
of the sale procedures presently proposed by the Debtor and ability 
to maximize the value of the Debtor’s assets.”120
 
 113. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2006). 
 114. See infra Part III. 
 115. No. 05-20050(MFW), 2006 WL 4063024 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 19, 2006). 
 116. Id. at *1. 
 117. Id. at *2. 
 118. Id. at *3–4. 
 119. Id. at *2. 
 120. Id. 
  When the court 
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turned to considering the bonus plan under the new strictures of 
section 503(c), the court found that because the plan was incentive-
based,121 it did not fall into the purview of sections 503(c)(1) or 
(c)(2).122  The court then held that section 503(c)(3) did not 
prohibit the proposed plan.123  Therefore, the court ruled that the 
debtors merely had to meet the burden of proof required by 
section 363—the business judgment rule—in order to be 
acceptable.124  The court held that the debtors had met this burden 
and thus approved the bonus plan under section 363.125
2. In re Airway Industries, Inc.
 
126
In In re Airway Industries, Inc., one of the debtor’s secured 
lenders wanted to give a bonus to certain employees of the debtor 
if the debtor sold all of its assets, either inside or outside of 
bankruptcy, and the secured lender received a cash distribution 
from that sale.
 
127  The court held that the proposed bonus was 
outside the confines of section 503(c) because the money was not 
coming from the debtor; rather, it was coming from an outside 
source and was only going to specific employees, not to the debtor 
itself.128  Thus, there was no risk of diminution of the estate.129
3. In re CEP Holdings, LLC
 
130
The court in In re CEP Holdings, LLC had previously issued an 
oral opinion approving the debtors’ “performance bonus plan” for 
“all but certain members of the Debtors’ management team.”
 
131
 
 121. Id. at *3 (finding that the bonus is clearly incentive-based because the 
managers are only eligible to receive it if they can achieve a higher gross sale price 
than the stalking-horse bid).  A “stalking-horse bid” is “[a]n initial bid on a 
bankrupt company’s assets from an interested buyer chosen by the bankrupt 
company.”  Investopedia, Stalking-Horse Bid, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/s/stalkinghorsebid.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). 
 122. Nobex, 2006 WL 4063024 at *3. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. 354 B.R. 82 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006). 
 127. Id. at 85. 
 128. Id. at 87–88. 
 129. Id. at 88. 
 130. No. 06-51847, 2006 WL 3422665 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006). 
 131. Id. at *1. 
  
The court had disallowed the bonus payments for the President 
and CEO and the President of the Board because they were 
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insiders of the company.132  “[T]he Court believed that it was not 
possible under Section 503(c)(3) . . . to find that the proposed 
payment amounts to these two insiders were, in the language of the 
Code, justified by the facts and circumstances of the case.”133
4. In re Calpine Corp.
   
134
In an unpublished order in In re Calpine Corp., the court 
granted Calpine’s motion for approval of its “Incentive Program,” 
which was made up of an “Emergence Incentive Plan,” a 
“Management Incentive Plan,” a “Supplemental Bonus Plan,” and 
a “Discretionary Bonus Plan.”
 
135  Each of these plans featured 
bonus payments contingent on the achievement of certain 
performance goals.136
5. In re Dana Corp. (“Dana I”)
  While the order did not set forth the court’s 
reasoning behind its ruling, it can be assumed that the court 
approved the plan under section 503(c)(3). 
137
It was not until Dana Corporation proposed its incentive plan 
in In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), that the court denied a plan under 
section 503(c).  The plan proposed by the debtor included base 
salary, an annual incentive bonus plan, and “Target Completion 
Bonuses” for each of the executives.
 
138  The completion bonuses 
had both fixed and variable components.139  The fixed component 
of the completion bonuses would be “payable in cash on the 
effective date of a plan of reorganization” if the executive was still 
employed by Dana.140  The variable component was based on the 
“Total Enterprise Value” of the debtor measured six months after 
the effective date.141
 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. (internal quotes omitted). 
 134. Order Authorizing the Implementation of the Calpine Incentive 
Program, No. 05-60200(BRL) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2005), available at 
http://www.bankruptcylitigationblog.com/calpine%20order%20approving%20in
centive%20plan.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
 135. Id. ¶ 2. 
 136. Id. at Ex. 1. 
 137. 351 B.R. 96 (Dana I) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 138. Id. at 99. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
  This bonus varied based on the level of the 
value, but a bonus was still payable even if the debtor’s enterprise 
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/6
  
1214 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:3 
value decreased a certain percentage.142
When the court analyzed the proposed plans, it noted that the 
fixed component of the plans could clearly not be categorized as 
incentive-based.
   
143  Because a portion of the plan was not tied to 
performance goals, the court held that it fell within section 
503(c)(1)’s prohibition of retention bonus plans.144  Thus, the 
court could not approve the plan regardless of whether the debtor 
had exercised its sound business judgment in proposing it.145
6. In re Dana Corp. (“Dana II”)
 
146
The Dana executives, however, were not deterred.  After the 
previous motion for approval of its bonus plan failed, the debtor 
modified the plan and negotiated with its creditors to gain their 
approval of the modified plan.
 
147  Notably, the court pointed out: 
“The plan before the Court today, unlike the previous iteration, 
has no guaranteed payments to the CEO or Senior Executives other 
than base salary and is a substantial retreat from the original 
proposals.”148  Because the plan in front of the court was now 
clearly based on performance goals and served to incentivize the 
executives, the plan could be approved under section 503(c).149
7. In re Global Home Products, LLC
 
150
The debtors in Global Home sought approval of two plans, one 
applicable to eligible managers and the other to eligible sales 
staff.
 
151  Both plans would only pay bonuses if the company 
achieved certain EBITDAR (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Rent) and cash flow goals.152
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 102 (“Without tying [the fixed] portion of the [completion] bonus 
to anything other than staying with the company until the Effective Date, this 
Court cannot categorize a bonus of this size and form as an incentive bonus.”). 
 144. See id. (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 503(C) (2006)).  The court added, in a now 
famous footnote: “If it walks like a duck (KERP) and quacks like a duck (KERP), 
it’s a duck (KERP).”  Id. at 102 n.3. 
 145. Id. at 100–01. 
 146. 358 B.R. 567 (Dana II) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 147. Id. at 571. 
 148. Id. at 574. 
 149. Id. at 584 (discussing § 503(C)).  
 150. 369 B.R. 778 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). 
 151. Id. at 780–81. 
 152. Id. 
  Importantly, the 
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court noted that the debtor had offered similar incentive programs 
prior to filing for bankruptcy.153
The court recognized that the new section 503(c) imposed 
severe limitations on bonus plans that were intended to retain 
employees.
 
154  However, the court also noted that “[t]he entire 
analysis changes if a bonus plan is not primarily motivated to retain 
personnel or is not in the nature of severance.”155  Following the 
reasoning of Dana II, the court declared that if the plan was not 
retentive in nature, it should be analyzed under the business 
judgment rule.156  The court also held that the plans were proposed 
in the ordinary course of the debtor’s business, making section 
503(c) inapplicable.157
8. In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc.
 
158
Nellson Nutraceutical also dealt with a longstanding employee 
incentive program.
 
159  The debtors had previously implemented a 
plan that awarded bonuses based on the company’s achievement of 
certain financial targets.160  The court determined that the debtor’s 
bonus programs were implemented in the ordinary course of the 
debtor’s business.161  Because the plan was in the ordinary course of 
business, the court refused to analyze it under the business 
judgment rule.162  Instead, the court held that the constraints of 
section 503(c)(3) only apply to transactions made “outside the 
ordinary course of business” and thus if a transaction—including 
an incentive-based bonus program—is within the ordinary course 
of business, section 503 will not apply to bar that transaction.163
 
 153. Id. at 780 n.4.   
 154. Id. at 785 (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 503(C) (2006)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 786. 
 157. Id. 
 158. 369 B.R. 787 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). 
 159. Id. at 795. 
 160. Id. at 793. 
 161. Id. at 797. 
 162. Id. at 799 (“Because the entire incentive program before the Court in this 
case is within the ordinary course of the Debtors’ business judgment, however, the 
criteria developed in Dana Corp. for analyzing whether an incentive plan adopted 
outside the ordinary course of business is a reasonable exercise of a debtor’s 
business judgment are not applicable here.”). 
 163. Id. at 801 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(3) (2006)). 
  
The incentive plans were allowed as a reasonable action within the 
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debtor’s ordinary course of business.164
B. What Standards Have Been Created by the Case Law Since BAPCPA 
Was Enacted? 
While the existing case law interpreting section 503(c) is 
currently somewhat sparse, some important standards can be 
gleaned from the cases discussed above. 
 
1. If a Plan Is To Be Considered Incentive-Based, What Constitutes 
an Incentive? 
Most of the cases decided under BAPCPA’s new section 503(c) 
have hinged on the idea of an incentive-based retention program 
rather than an outlawed KERP.165  The courts have declared that 
this distinction can either make or break the approval of a bonus 
plan for employees of a bankrupt company.166  The incentives 
accepted by courts thus far have included giving employees a bonus 
if they can secure a higher selling price for the company’s assets 
than the current stalking-horse bid167 or allowing bonuses for 
employees if the company can exceed specific EBITDAR targets.168  
As the Dana II court noted, these incentives encourage the eligible 
employees to “produce and increase the value of the estate . . . .”169
The Dana I court was the first to examine section 503(c) 
carefully and create some boundaries between retention and 
incentive-based plans.  In Dana I, the court noted that “section 
503(c) establishes specific evidentiary standards that must be met 
before a bankruptcy court may authorize payments made to an 
insider for the purpose of inducing such person to remain with a 
debtor’s business, or payments made on account of severance.”
   
170
 
 164. Id. at 804. 
 165. See supra Part III.A. 
 166. See, e.g., In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 785 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2007) (“The entire analysis changes if a bonus plan is not primarily motivated to 
retain personnel or is not in the nature of severance.”). 
 167. In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050, 2006 WL 4063024, at *2–3 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2006).  See also supra note 121 (defining a “stalking-horse bid”). 
 168. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 574 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Global Home, 369 B.R. at 780–81; Nellson Nutraceutical, 369 B.R. at 791–92. 
 169. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 584. 
 170. In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
  
The court cited to sections 503(c)(1) and (2) before declaring that 
if a plan falls within the purview of either section, the “Bankruptcy 
Code makes it abundantly clear” that such a plan cannot be 
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allowed even though there may be a “sound business purpose” for 
its implementation.171  Thus, when a court examines a proposed 
bonus program, it must first determine if it is impermissible under 
sections 503(c)(1) or (2).  Although the debtor urged that the 
proposed plan did not fall into either of these sections and should 
instead be analyzed under section 503(c)(3), the court found that 
the proposed plans were not incentive-based and so were not 
allowable under section 503(c)(1).172  The court did go out of its 
way to emphasize, though, that bonus plans could be allowed 
under section 503(c): “I do not find that incentivizing plans which 
may have some components that arguably have a retentive effect, 
necessarily violate section 503(c)’s requirements.”173
It was not until Dana II that the court had an opportunity to 
clarify the distinction between retentive and incentivizing bonus 
programs.
 
174  First, the court set out a “holistic” approach to 
examining a proposed plan.175
[W]hether the amount of cost or expense is reasonable 
and in the best interest of the estate; whether the services 
to be provided are likely to enhance a successful 
reorganization or liquidation of the debtor; [and] 
whether the debtor exercised proper business judgment 
in implementing any application for continuing, 
resuming, or retaining the executive.
  In general, a plan must be 
considered as a whole and the specifics of the plan must be 
examined, including: 
176
By examining a plan with its entire purpose in mind, as well as 
taking into account section 503(c)’s limitations on KERPs and 
severance packages,
 
177 the Dana II court declared that “a true 
incentive plan may not be constrained by 503(c) limitations.”178
Thus, the distinction between a plan that is geared toward 
merely retaining employees and a plan that encourages the 
employees to meet certain goals becomes paramount to a plan’s 
success.
   
179
 
 171. Id. at 100–01. 
 172. Id. at 102. 
 173. Id. at 103. 
 174. Dana II, 358 B.R. 567. 
 175. Id. at 571. 
 176. Id. 
 177. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1), (2) (2006). 
 178. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 571. 
  The Dana II court emphasized that in order for a plan to 
 179. Id. at 575.  The Dana II court examined the statute and concluded that 
“section 503(c) was not intended to foreclose a chapter 11 debtor from reasonably 
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be one that relied on incentives, the plan must be “calculated to 
achieve the desired performance.”180  The court also noted that 
factors like an analysis of which employees needed to be 
incentivized, what kind of incentives are generally applicable in an 
industry, and whether the debtor received independent counsel in 
creating the incentive plan should also be considered.181  If a plan is 
clearly an incentive plan, even if it may have some retentive impact, 
it will be analyzed under section 503(c)(3) and not automatically 
subjected to the high evidentiary standards of sections 503(c)(1) 
and (2).182
From these cases, and from Dana I and II in particular, it is 
clear that structuring a bonus plan around incentives will make it 
much more likely to be approved by the court.  Though Congress 
may have intended to curtail executive compensation with the 
implementation of section 503(c),
 
183 the courts have interpreted 
the statute as written to limit only clearly retentive programs.184  A 
bankruptcy court will examine a proposed plan and consider what 
kind of performance goals are to be achieved in determining its 
incentivizing nature.185  If those goals are indeed related to the 
performance of the employees, then the employees will earn their 
bonus and the plan will be approved.186
2. What Is the Definition of an “Insider” for Purposes of Section 
503(c)? 
   
The Code provides a definition of an “insider” in section 
 
compensating employees, including ‘insiders,’ for their contribution to the 
debtors’ reorganization.”  Id. (citing In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050, 2006 WL 
4063024, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)). 
 180. Id. at 576. 
 181. Id. at 577. 
 182. See id. at 576; In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 787 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2007). 
 183. See infra Part II.C. 
 184. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 576 (“[S]ection 503(c)(3) gives the court discretion 
as to bonus and incentive plans, which are not primarily motivated by retention or 
in the nature of severance.”). 
 185. Id. at 576–77. 
 186. See MaryJo Bellew & Edith K. Altice, Tackle § 503(c) by Structuring a “MIP” 
– And Other Strategies to Have in Your Playbook, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 76–77 
(2008).  Bellew and Altice point out that “debtors must structure their proposed 
insider compensation bonuses and awards around measurable targets or 
benchmarks, such as achieving certain EBITDAR, cash flow or sales targets.”  Id. at 
77.  However, it is also important that the selected target is not “so low that 
payment will essentially be guaranteed.”  Id. at 78. 
25
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101.187  However, the definition is not all that conclusive.188  Rather, 
it is merely a list that includes certain employment positions within 
a debtor corporation or people within certain family relationships 
with a debtor.189  Thus, an important distinction for section 503(c) 
purposes—whether an employee is an “insider”—can be a hazy 
area of interpretation for the courts.190
Past precedent and legislative history does provide some 
direction.  “The legislative history of section 101(31) infers that an 
‘insider’ is a person or entity with ‘a sufficiently close relationship 
with the debtor that his conduct is made subject to closer scrutiny 
than those dealing at arm’s length with debtor.’”
 
191  In addition, 
case law has also emphasized the position of the employee and 
whether or not his position is high enough that he would be 
involved in setting the policy or making important decisions for the 
company.192
Since the enactment of BAPCPA, one case has looked squarely 
at the use of the term “insider” in section 503.
 
193  In In re CEP 
Holdings, the court emphasized the idea of control in defining who 
is an insider for 503(c) purposes.194
 
 187. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2006). 
 188. Bellew & Altice, supra note 186, at 78. 
 189. Id.  For example, if a debtor is a corporation, insiders of the debtor would 
include a director, officer, or person in control of the debtor.  § 101(31)(B).  In 
addition, an insider could be a “managing agent of the debtor.”  § 101(31)(F). 
 190. Marcia L. Goldstein et al., First Day Issues: Key Employees, ALI-ABA Course 
of Study, Mar. 29, 2007 (“In light of the recent changes to section 503 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the status of an employee and whether or not an individual is 
an ‘insider’ are key elements in developing an employee compensation bonus 
program.”). 
 191. Id. at 9 (citing S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Admin. News 5787, 
5810). 
 192. See, e.g., In re NMI Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. 357, 369–70 (Bankr. D. Dist. Col. 
1995).  The court in In re NMI Systems, Inc. held that: 
The appropriate test for whether [an employee] was an officer is whether 
[the employee] occupied a high position within the corporation making 
him active in setting overall corporate policy or performing other 
important executive duties . . . .  The term “officer” . . . is broader and 
includes, for example, those in the collective group exercising overall 
authority regarding the debtor’s corporate decisions who, as members of 
that insider group, are in a position to exert undue influence over 
corporate decisions . . . . 
Id.  See also 9 AM. JUR. Bankruptcy § 210 (2008). 
 193. In re CEP Holdings, LLC, No. 06-51847, 2006 WL 3422665, at *1 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006). 
  One of the most important 
 194. Id. at *3 (“The Court believes that in the context of Section 503(c)(3), 
insider status under the ‘control’ provision of Section 101(31)(B)(iii) should be 
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things to know in determining who is an insider when considering 
bonus plans is “whether the potential plan recipient had significant 
input into the negotiation of the plan (including the amount of 
additional compensation that the employee would receive under 
the plan).”195  It is important to note, however, that the title of an 
employee is not itself determinative of insider status;196 a court must 
look at the entirety of the employee’s status and responsibilities in 
order to determine his insider or non-insider status.197
Section 503(c)(3) forbids payments “that are outside the 
ordinary course of business and not justified by the facts and 
circumstances of the case . . . .”
 
3. What Is the Standard for Approving Plans Under Section 
503(c)(3)? 
198  The section is otherwise silent 
about when a payment would be “justified by the facts and 
circumstances” of a case.  Courts, therefore, have interpreted this 
language to simply be a reiteration of the business judgment rule 
already used by bankruptcy courts in applying other sections of the 
Code.199  In particular, the Dana II court declared that section 
503(c)(3) called for no different determination than whether the 
debtor’s proposed bonus plan met the “sound business judgment” 
test.200
4. How Have the Courts Applied the Business Judgment Rule to 
Proposed Bonus Plans Since BAPCPA? 
 
The “business judgment rule” is just what its name implies—it 
 
determined, at least in part, by reference to the payment recipient’s control of the 
specific transaction under consideration and the impact of that transaction upon 
the debtor’s creditors.”). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at *1.   
 197. See Craig A. Christensen, Key Employee Retention Plans (“KERPS”) Under the 
2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Amendments (“BAPCPA”), 
Am. Bankr. Inst., Feb. 14, 2008.  Christensen points out that “many individuals 
bear the nomenclature of ‘officer,’ such as vice-president, but a careful 
examination of the official corporate records will show no action by the board of 
directors actually making these individuals an officer of the corporation.  Without 
official board action it is unlikely that they qualify as ‘officers.’”  Id. 
 198. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(3) (2006). 
 199. See Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3.  Courts have used sections 363(b) 
and 105(a) as the basis of the business judgment rule.  Id.  For further discussion 
of the business judgment rule, see supra Part II.A.4 and infra Part III.C. 
 200. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 576 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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requires a bankruptcy judge to weigh the evidence presented to 
determine whether the debtor has exercised sound judgment 
before the judge may approve the debtor’s proposed course of 
action.201  In the case of approving KERPs, courts also required that 
the debtor’s proposed plan was “fair and reasonable.”202
While BAPCPA may have effectively outlawed KERPs, courts 
have still approved incentive-based bonus plans under section 
503(c)(3) by applying the business judgment rule.
 
203
• Is there a reasonable relationship between the plan 
proposed and the results to be obtained, i.e., . . . is 
the plan calculated to achieve the desired 
performance? 
  The factors to 
be considered in applying the business judgment rule were 
reiterated in Dana II: 
     Courts consider the following in determining if the 
structure of a compensation proposal and the process for 
developing the proposal meet the “sound business 
judgment” test: 
• Is the cost of the plan reasonable in the context of 
the debtor’s assets, liabilities and earning potential? 
• Is the scope of the plan fair and reasonable; does it 
apply to all employees; does it discriminate 
unfairly? 
• Is the plan or proposal consistent with industry 
standards? 
 
 201. See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (C.A.N.Y. 1983).  The Lionel 
court interpreted section 363 of the Code, which allows a judge to authorize the 
use, sale, or lease of the debtor’s property “other than in the ordinary course of 
business . . . .”  11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).  See also In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 
780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) (“[F]or the debtor-in-possession or trustee to 
satisfy its fiduciary duty to the debtor, creditors and equity holders, there must be 
some articulated business justification for using, selling, or leasing the property 
outside the ordinary course of business.”) (citing Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071).  
Coupled with the business justification is also a rebuttable presumption that the 
debtor has acted in good faith in proposing the course of business.  In re 
Integrated Res., Inc., 147 B.R. 650, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The business judgment 
rule ‘is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”) (quoting Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)). 
 202. In re Allied Holdings, Inc., 337 B.R. 716, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005).  See 
also Hage, supra note 9, at Part I.B.3. 
 203. In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 787 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); Dana 
II, 358 B.R. 567, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050, 
2006 WL 4063024, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006). 
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• What were the due diligence efforts of the debtor 
in investigating the need for a plan; analyzing 
which key employees need to be incentivized; what 
is available; what is generally applicable in a 
particular industry? 
• Did the debtor receive independent counsel in 
performing due diligence and in creating and 
authorizing the incentive compensation?204
Thus, in general, courts will look at a proposed incentive-based 
bonus plan and consider these factors in determining whether the 
choice to implement the plan is a sound business judgment.  In 
reality, however, the business judgment rule comes with a very 
deferential treatment of the debtor’s decisions,
 
205
C. Applying the Business Judgment Rule Through Section 503(c)(3) Has 
Allowed Debtors to Continue to Offer Bonus Plans Only Slightly Different 
from Pre-BAPCPA KERPs 
 so this test may 
not be so difficult to pass. 
Section 503(c)(1) was intended—and has been interpreted—
to preclude a debtor from offering key employee retention 
programs.206  Indeed, some commentators have criticized this ban207 
and expressed fear that the requirements in section 503(c)(1) were 
impossible to meet208 and contrary to the Code’s overall policy.209
 
 204. Dana II, 358 B.R. at 576–77. 
 205. In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 80 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (stating that a 
debtor’s business decision “should be approved by the court unless it is shown to 
be ‘so manifestly unreasonable that it could not be based upon sound business 
judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice.’”) (citing In re Logical 
Software, Inc., 66 B.R. 683, 686 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986)). 
 206. Global Home, 369 B.R. at 785 (“The statute makes it abundantly clear that 
in a post-BAPCPA bankruptcy case, KERPs and severance arrangements subject to 
review under § 503(c)—those whose purpose is to retain employees—are severely 
restricted.”); In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 100–01 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (“The recent amendment to the Bankruptcy Code makes it abundantly 
clear that, to the extent a proposed transfer falls within sections 503(c)(1) or 
(c)(2), then the business judgment rule does not apply, irrespective of whether a 
sound business purpose may actually exist.”). 
 207. David Crapo, Changes to Key Retention Plans: Amendments Significantly 
Modified the Treatment of Severances and Bonuses, 187 N.J.L.J. 173, 173 (2007) (“The 
new § 503(c) eliminates much of the discretion that debtors had previously 
enjoyed in implementing KERPs and severance plans and that bankruptcy courts 
enjoyed in evaluating and approving them.”). 
  
 208. See Richard Levin & Alesia Ranney-Marinelli, The Creeping Repeal of Chapter 
11: The Significant Business Provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 603, 620–21 (2005); Revich, supra note 
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However, solace can now be found in the bankruptcy court’s 
interpretation of section 503(c)(3) and its willingness to work 
around section 503(c)(1)’s feeble roadblock to allowing debtors to 
offer bonuses to their employees. 
Nobex was the first case in which the court declared that an 
incentive-based plan was not the same as a retention plan.210  
Because it was incentive-based, the plan did not fall into the 
purview of section 503(c)(1) and section 503(c)(3) did not 
prohibit incentive-based pay to employees.211
Following Nobex, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York heard a motion to approve debtor 
Calpine Corporation’s incentive program.
  Thus, the first inkling 
of how to avoid the anti-KERP provisions was blotted into 
precedent. 
212  With no 
memorandum explaining the decision, the court granted the 
debtor’s motion in a bench order and approved an incentive 
program consisting of an “Emergence Incentive Plan,” 
“Management Incentive Plan,” “Supplemental Bonus Plan,” and 
“Discretionary Bonus Plan.”213  Payments under the Emergence 
Incentive Plan and Management Incentive Plan were contingent 
upon an employee’s achievement of certain performance targets.214  
The Supplemental Bonus Plan, interestingly, was a retention-type 
program but was written to exclude the debtor’s “insiders.”215  
However, no definition of an “insider” was provided.216
 
103, at 95; Margaret Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
451, 457 (2007). 
 209. Ira L. Herman, Statutory Schizophrenia and the New Chapter 11, 2 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J. 30, 30 (2007) (“The uncertainty, delay and added expense that may be 
engendered by these BAPCPA provisions could be particularly nettlesome if the 
courts are to move reorganization cases more quickly through the bankruptcy 
system to give effect to the second policy imperative embedded in BAPCPA 
chapter 11 provisions: ‘the need for speed.’” (citation omitted)). 
 210. In re Nobex Corp., No. 05-20050, 2006 WL 4063024, at *3 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2006). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Order Authorizing the Implementation of the Calpine Incentive 
Program, supra note 134. 
 213. Id. ¶ 2, Ex. 1. 
 214. Id. at Ex. 1. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
  Finally, the 
Discretionary Bonus Plan was simply a $500,000 pool from which 
could be distributed, at the sole discretion of the CEO, bonus 
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payments of up to $25,000 per employee per year.217  No reference 
was made to section 503(c) in the order.218
Dana I succeeded Calpine in the bonus plan hunt, and the 
debtors urged the court to follow the Calpine lead.
 
219  The court, 
however, paused to examine the plans proposed by the debtor and 
found that the plans themselves were not truly incentive-based.220  
The sticking point was that the plans proposed involved some 
“fixed” payments that would be made to an employee simply 
because he had remained at the company until the “effective date 
of a plan of reorganization.”221  Thus, the court brought section 
503(c)(1) into play and held that this non-incentivizing—or 
retention—plan could not be approved.222  The court did, however, 
go out of its way to leave the door open for truly incentive-based 
bonus plans.223
The door being left wide open, Dana Corp. adjusted its plan 
and tried again to cross the threshold.  With a slightly different 
plan laid before it, the court declared it to be properly incentive-
based.
 
224  Following the Nobex and Calpine lead, the court applied 
section 503(c)(3) to the plan in order to determine if it should be 
authorized.225  As section 503(c)(3) really requires “no more 
stringent a test than” the business judgment rule,226 “section 
503(c)(3) gives the court discretion as to bonus and incentive 
plans, which are not primarily motivated by retention or in the 
nature of severance.”227  The plans were authorized as reasonable 
business judgments on the part of the debtors.228
These cases make it clear that bonus plans can be approved 
when they are incentive-based and are proper exercises of the 
 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 101–02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).  In 
fact, both the Calpine and Dana motions were heard and decided by the same 
judge, Judge Burton R. Lifland. 
 220. Id. at 102. 
 221. Id. at 99. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 103. 
 224. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 574 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 225. Id. at 576; see also id. at 584 (“By presenting an executive compensation 
package that properly incentivizes the CEO and Senior Executives to produce and 
increase the value of the estate, the Debtors have established that section 
503(c)(1) does not apply to the Executive Compensation Motion.”). 
 226. Id. at 576. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 584. 
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debtor’s business judgment.  There is, however, another avenue 
toward approval of bonus plans that seems to circumvent section 
503(c) entirely.   
This route began to take shape in Global Home.  In that case the 
court did find that the bonus plan was properly incentive-based.229  
However, the plan in question was not a “new” plan; a nearly 
identical plan had been previously implemented by the company 
before filing for bankruptcy.230  Thus, because the plan was not 
new, the court held that it was “clearly in the ordinary course of 
[the debtor’s] business.”231  The court then went on to declare that 
“[t]he Court is fully satisfied on the basis of the facts presented that 
[the debtor is] asking it to approve incentive, not retention plans 
and, therefore, section 503(c) does not come into play.”232
Nellson Nutraceutical more clearly defined the path for avoiding 
section 503(c) altogether.  The debtors in that case had used 
incentive-based bonus programs for several years prior to filing for 
bankruptcy.
  In one 
fell swoop, the court simply removed section 503(c) from 
consideration, but it is unclear from the decision if this was because 
the plan was incentivizing or because the plan was in the debtor’s 
ordinary course of business. 
233  The court found the debtor’s plan to be in the 
ordinary course of the debtor’s business.234
As a beginning rule, the court held that “if the Court 
determines that a transaction is in the ordinary course of a debtor’s 
business, the Court will not entertain an objection to the 
transaction . . . .”
 
235  However, the court did note that section 
503(c)(1) does not apply only to transactions outside of the 
ordinary course of business.236  By its plain language section 
503(c)(1) applies to any transfer that is “for the benefit of, an 
insider of the debtor for the purpose of inducing such person to 
remain with the debtor’s business.”237
 
 229. In re Global Home Prods., 369 B.R. 778, 786 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). 
 230. Id.  
 231. Id.  
 232. Id. at 787. 
 233. In re Nellson Nutraceutical, Inc., 369 B.R. 787, 795 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007). 
 234. Id. at 797. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 800. 
 237. Id. at 800–01 (quoting § 503(c)(1)(2006)). 
  Thus, creditors can still raise 
objections under this section and can argue that a proposed bonus 
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plan is retentive in nature and thus barred by section 503(c)(1).238
However, the constraints of section 503(c)(3) only apply to 
transactions made “outside the ordinary course of business”
   
239 and 
thus, if a transaction—including an incentive-based bonus 
program—is within the ordinary course of business, section 503 will 
not apply to bar that payment.240  Simply put, if a debtor can show 
that a bonus program is within the ordinary course of its business, 
and that bonus program is not retentive in nature, section 503 will 
not come into play at all.  It is merely up to the court to determine 
whether or not the plan is a sound exercise of the debtor’s business 
judgment under Code section 363.241
If a company is capable of doing a little pre-bankruptcy 
planning, this avenue may be useful for implementing bonus 
programs.
   
242  As one commentator put it: “If the plan is part of the 
ordinary course of business of the debtor and the industry, there 
should be little concern that the motive is traditional incentive and 
not primarily post-bankruptcy retention.”243
D. Judicial Interpretation of Section 503(c) Has Begun, but Questions 
and Flaws Still Remain in the Statute 
   
While courts have interpreted and applied section 503(c) in a 
handful of cases, there is some language in the section that has yet 
to be addressed.  Boldly stated, “[t]he language of § 503(c) is not 
well drafted . . . .”244  For instance, section 503(c)(1) restricts 
payments to an insider “for the purpose of inducing such person to 
remain.”245
 
 238. See id. at 801 (stating that section 503(c)(1) is applicable “provided that 
the payments under the bonus program are to ‘an insider of the debtor for the 
purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor’s business.’”). 
 239. § 503(c)(3). 
 240. Nellson Nutraceutical, 369 B.R. at 801. 
 241. Id. at 804.  See also Bellew, supra note 186, at 78 (recommending that 
debtors propose plans that will be considered within the “ordinary course” of their 
business). 
 242. See Crapo, supra note 207, at 173 (“Section 503(c) clearly creates a strong 
incentive for debtors to characterize or structure [bonus plan] payments 
obligations to the insider, as something other than either retention or severance 
payments.”). 
 243. Christensen, supra note 197, at 157. 
 244. Revich, supra note 103, at 94. 
 245. 11 U.S.C. § 503(c)(1) (2006). 
  The meaning of this phrase is not given anywhere in 
the Code.  If we take the everyday meanings of the words 
“purpose,” “induce,” and “remain” into consideration, section 
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503(c)(1) could be read to mean “payments to an insider are 
prohibited if they are set up in order to persuade or influence that 
person to stay with the same company.”246  But this reading still 
gives us no reference point as to the length of time an employee 
must “remain” with the company,247 nor does it tell us if the 
“purpose” involved must be the sole purpose behind the 
payments.248
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In order to truly achieve the goal Congress set in passing 
section 503(c), several changes should be implemented.  First, the 
section itself should be modified to make its provisions more 
clear.249  Second, further limitations should be placed upon the 
bonuses available, even those that are not retention-based.250  
Finally, bankruptcy judges should be encouraged to take a closer 
look at all proposed bonus plans and should use their inherent 
powers251 to ensure that bonuses are necessary and reasonable 
without deferring too much to the business judgment of the 
debtor.252
A. How Should Section 503(c) Be Changed to End Unnecessary Bonuses 
or to Reduce the Size of the Bonuses? 
 
The goal of the legislature is clear—section 503(c) was 
intended to curtail the massive bonuses being paid to executives 
when the companies they helmed were driven into bankruptcy.253
 
 246. Hage, supra note 9, at Part IV.B. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Infra Part IV.A. 
 250. Infra Part IV.B. 
 251. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).  This section, entitled “Power of court,” 
states that: “The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary 
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”  Id. 
 252. See supra Part III.C. 
 253. See supra Part II.C. 
  
While this intent has been followed by the judges interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code, section 503(c) could be clarified and its 
requirements tightened by implementing the following 
suggestions. 
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1. Implement Procedural Limitations on Motions for and Approval 
of Incentive Programs 
Among bankruptcy petitioners, there are certain motions that 
are referred to as “first day” motions.254  Among these is the motion 
to approve employee bonus plans.255  By filing these motions 
contemporaneously with the filing of the bankruptcy petition 
itself,256
In a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee, Richard 
Levin of the National Bankruptcy Conference proposed 
implementing procedural limitations on the timing of motions for 
approval of bonus plans.
 the debtors give the creditors and other interested parties 
very little time to scrutinize the proposed plans before the issue is 
decided. 
257
A reasonable minimum notice period should be imposed 
to allow a creditors’ committee to be formed and to 
provide the committee and other parties a fair 
opportunity for review of the proposed program, and, if 
agreement is not reached, for there to be a fair 
opportunity for the parties to be heard before the court.
  He suggested that: 
258
Indeed, the cases interpreting section 503(c) have already 
found the agreement or disagreement of the creditors’ committees 
and other creditors to be an important factor for consideration.  In 
Dana I the court noted that “[t]he plan generated extensive 
opposition.”
 
259  However, in Dana II the court noted with approval 
that the debtor had modified its plan and had negotiated with 
many of its creditors to gain approval of the modified plan.260
 
 254. See Am. Bankr. Inst., Early Case Motions: First-Day Orders: KERPS; Critical 
Vendors, Oct. 5, 2007 [hereinafter Early Case Motions].  Examples of common first-
day motions include motions on the effect of the bankruptcy filing on a debtor’s 
operations, motions that address the debtor’s relationships with its employees, 
creditors and customers, and motions relating to additional financing that the 
debtor intends to seek after the bankruptcy filing.  Id. 
 255. Id.; see also Goldstein et al., supra note 190, at 4–10. 
 256. Early Case Motions, supra note 254. 
 257. Executive Compensation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases: How Much Is Too 
Much?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 22 (2007) [hereinafter “Levin Testimony”] 
(testimony of Richard Levin, Esq.). 
 258. Id. at 26. 
 259. In re Dana Corp. (Dana I), 351 B.R. 96, 98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 260. In re Dana Corp. (Dana II), 358 B.R. 567, 571–72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
  
Allowing the creditors to have input on the proposed bonus plans 
will decrease the possibility that the plan overreaches and allows 
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bonuses that are out of line.261
2. Create a Strict Definition of Which Employees Constitute 
“Insiders” for the Purposes of Section 503(c) 
The term “insider” is a somewhat flexible concept in 
bankruptcy law.  The only major case dealing with the definition is 
NMI Systems, Inc. v. Pillard, which held that: 
 
[T]he appropriate test for whether [the employee] was an 
officer is whether [the employee] occupied a high 
position within the corporation making him active in 
setting overall corporate policy or performing other 
important executive duties of such a character that it is 
likely that he would be accorded less than arm’s-length 
treatment in the payment of his antecedent claim against 
the debtor. . . .262
Levin also proposed amending section 503(c) to tighten up 
the definition of insider so as to remove any doubt regarding whom 
the section should apply to.
 
While this decision does give some guidance, a definition this open-
ended can lead to substantial disagreement and litigation.   
263  Instead of requiring a factual 
determination in each case, the insider designation should be 
modeled on the SEC Regulations.264  Specifically, Item 402(a) of 
SEC Regulation S-K requires a corporation to disclose the 
compensation received by the three most highly compensated 
executive officers.265  Limiting the insider definition to these 
individuals, Levin argues, allows a debtor to “offer the incentives 
necessary to keep key middle managers and star performers 
focused on their jobs, without generating expensive, time-
consuming, and distracting litigation.”266
 
 261. See Levin Testimony, supra note 257, at 26 (participation by all involved 
parties is more likely to lead to “the negotiation of reasonable and balanced 
solutions.”). 
 262. 179 B.R. 357, 369–70 (Bankr. D.C. 1995) (quoted in In re CEP Holdings, 
LLC, No. 06-51847, 2006 WL 3422665, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006)).  
For a detailed analysis of NMI Systems, see Brad B. Erens, New Section 503(c) of the 
Bankruptcy Code – Who Is an “Officer” Under the KERP Amendment?, 2 No. 11 ANDREWS 
BANKR. LITIG. REP. 2 (2005). 
 263. Levin Testimony, supra note 257, at 22, 26. 
 264. Id. at 26. 
 265. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3) (2008).  The “three most highly compensated” 
individuals does not include the PEO and PFO.  Id. 
 266. Levin Testimony, supra note 257, at 26. 
  This limitation would also 
exclude an important or high-powered employee who may have 
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control over some aspect of the debtor’s business, but who has no 
input into the level of compensation given to himself or to other 
employees.267
This definition, however, may be somewhat narrow for the 
purposes that section 503(c) intended to achieve.
 
268  As discussed 
above, Congress enacted section 503(c) in response to the 
bankruptcies of several large corporations and the wealthy 
executive compensation packages that were proposed and 
approved.269  As the law currently stands, rather than focusing on 
the specific executives defined by SEC Regulation, “a court may 
determine that officers of a debtor for purposes of new Section 
503(c) are only those senior employees of the debtor who have 
significant influence or input with respect to the design of the 
debtor’s [bonus plan] . . . .”270
B. What Additional Limitations Should Be Put on Incentive Plans in 
Chapter 11 Bankruptcies? 
Merely implementing procedural limits or fiddling with the 
language of section 503(c) is not the only way to improve the 
process of approving bonus plans or to narrowly tailor the use of 
bonus plans to those circumstances where they are necessary and 
reasonable.  For the reasons explained below, Congress should 
continue to examine the use of bonus plans and should consider 
other limitations on their amounts, recipients, and requirements. 
  Creating a definition of the term 
“insider” that takes into account the individuals involved with the 
bonus plan creation process may help courts apply the standards of 
503(c) uniformly and justly in many different circumstances. 
First, there is no solid evidence that KERPs or incentive-based 
programs actually contribute to the successful reorganization of a 
company in Chapter 11.271
 
 267. Id. 
 268. See Erens, supra note 262. 
 269. See id.  For example, the Polaroid bankruptcy was discussed in the debates 
on the Senate floor several times.  See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 23 S1990 (daily ed. Mar. 
3, 2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).  Erens suggests that “[t]he resulting KERP 
amendment introduced by Kennedy, then, might be seen as a reaction to what 
some perceived as abuse of power by senior management at Polaroid.”  Erens, 
supra note 262.  See also supra Part II.C. 
 270. Erens, supra note 262. 
 271. Keach, supra note 13, at Part IV.  Keach notes that the bankruptcy of 
Kmart as an example of a company that had obtained a KERP for key employees 
only to have many of those covered employees leave the company anyway.  Id. 
  Robert Keach highlighted this 
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shortcoming even before BAPCPA was enacted: “There is no 
evidence that bonus payments actually result in the retention of 
employees who would otherwise leave, and considerable anecdotal 
evidence in cases with KERPs that they made no material 
difference.”272  Keach goes on to cite to human resource experts 
who have pointed out that money is often not a critical factor in 
retaining employees.273
One of the strongest arguments against KERPs and bonus 
programs may be that when bonuses are paid to already highly 
compensated executives, employee morale can be easily lost.
  If money is not a critical factor, why should 
a debtor throw it at employees who may already want to leave?   
274  All 
too often in business bankruptcies, the rank and file employees are 
asked to sacrifice wages, benefits, and working conditions while the 
executives—who were in charge when the finances started to get 
shaky—are offered bonuses and incentives to remain at the 
company.275
This effect was obvious in Geneva Steel.
  The results of such proposals can be disastrous for the 
company.   
276  In that case, the 
debtor proposed a large bonus program for key executives, arguing 
that the plan was within its sound business judgment.277  However, 
the court noted that “[w]hile there is evidence that retention of the 
key employees is critical to Geneva’s survival, there is also evidence 
that granting the Motion as prayed may jeopardize the continuing 
support of the Steelworkers in Geneva’s reorganization process.”278
 
 272. Id. at Part III. 
 273. Id. at Part IV. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See, e.g., Executive Compensation in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases: How Much 
Is Too Much?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 14–17 (2007) (testimony of Antoinette 
Muoneke).  Ms. Muoneke’s prepared statement detailed the pay cuts, longer 
hours, and loss of benefits she suffered after the bankruptcy of her employer, 
United Airlines.  Id. at 15–17.  She also expressed her anger at enduring these 
losses while at the same time United’s “CEO used the bankruptcy laws to take pay, 
bonuses and stock equaling over 1000 times” her compensation and received a 
bonus of “125% of his annual salary.”  Id. at 17. 
 276. In re Geneva Steel Co., 236 B.R. 770, 773 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999). 
 277. Id. at 772.  This case was decided pre-BAPCPA and involved a true KERP; 
this does not limit the similar effect incentive-based bonus plans can have on 
employee morale in post-BAPCPA bankruptcies. 
 278. Id. at 773. 
  
The loss of union support would mean the loss of the foundational 
workforce of the company.  Thus, the court denied the motion and 
encouraged the debtor to rework the plan and to take the concerns 
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of the union into account.279
A company files for bankruptcy, thousands of workers lose 
their jobs and the stock price becomes nearly worthless. 
So what do its executives and managers do?  They ask for 
bonuses, sometimes worth millions of dollars.  Never 
mind cost-cutting in every other part of the business. 
Never mind tough economic times that make it less likely 
key employees will flee to other jobs.
  It is obvious from this case that overly 
generous bonus plans can cause havoc for the executives who 
propose them. 
Finally, these large bonuses also have a detrimental effect on 
the perception of the bankruptcy system by the public at large.  For 
example, one newspaper report began with the following: 
280
Executive compensation itself has become a hot topic in the 
American media
 
281
C. Bankruptcy Judges Have the Power to Stem the Tide of These Large 
Bonuses and Should Do So More Often 
Even without specific Congressional action, the bankruptcy 
court has the inherent power to rein in any overblown bonus plan.  
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code states: 
 and the approval of excessive bonuses continues 
to raise the ire of the public.  Thus, further caps should be placed 
on the amounts available for bonuses and on the executives eligible 
to receive them. 
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that 
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of 
this title.  No provision of this title providing for the 
raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed 
to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action 
or making any determination necessary or appropriate to 
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent 
an abuse of process.282
The equitable powers of the bankruptcy court should be brought to 
bear on motions for large bonuses.  This power allows a judge to 
“look through form to the substance of a transaction and devise 
 
 
 279. Id. at 774. 
 280. Rachel Beck, Greed or Need? Big Bonuses During Bankruptcy, TELEGRAPH-
HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), Jan. 26, 2003, at D3. 
 281. See supra Part II.B. and note 1. 
 282. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006). 
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new remedies where those at law are inadequate.”283  Judges should 
not feel required to adhere to a presumption of reasonableness 
under the business judgment rule when examining these 
programs.284  Instead, a court should feel free to analyze the bonus 
plans before them and raise any objections and concerns on their 
own prerogative.285
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The issue of KERPs and bonuses is not a new one in 
bankruptcy.  However, this issue is now part of the larger, more 
noticeable, public awareness of executive compensation.286
 
 283. In re Chinichian v. Campolongo, 784 F.2d 1440, 1443 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(citations omitted). 
 284. Allison K. Verderber Herriott, Comment, Toward an Understanding of the 
Dialectical Tensions Inherent in CEO and Key Employee Retention Plans During 
Bankruptcy, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 589 (2004) (“Case law has defined the business 
judgment rule as ‘a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors 
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.’”) (quoting 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). 
 285. Id. at 588. 
 286. See supra note 1. 
  
Congress has attempted to make changes, but these changes have 
not yet completely addressed the issue.  More will have to be done 
before section 503 is clearly stated, uniformly interpreted, and 
successful in its purpose. 
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